June Meetup Highlights

BreachForce’s June edition bought 2 talks.

• NaughtyMag: Making Macbook Blink Its Data Away
  by Adhokshaj Mishra

• Securing the Mind of Machines : GenAI Security & Trust Frameworks
  by Harsh Tandel

Naughty Mag

Overview:

• A side-channel attack that turns Apple’s MagSafe LED indicator into a data exfiltration device..

• What are Side Channel Attacks? Software can control LED status using SMC to indicate color change if battery over 80%

• The LED, usually meant to indicate charging status (amber/green), can be modulated to transmit data covertly

Key Concepts:

🔌 MagSafe Connection Points:

• Uses its own protocol

• Pinout:

  • Ground

  • Power

  • Adapter Sense

• 1-wire protocol: computer ↔ cable ↔ charger (powerbrick)

• All communicate with each other to negotiate power

• Also lets them control which connectors are manufacture supported

• Integrated Circuit DS24123: Can take command over 1-wire from Macbook and change LED status

⚠Note: The IC involved is not widely documented

How Control Works

• Charger Startup:

  • Charger provides very low current initially

  • Why negotiation works first - then fails

  • Initial creators - which created the ability to change MagSafe charger color.

    • https://apphousekitchen.com/aldente-overview/features/#control-magsafe-led

    • https://github.com/AppHouseKitchen/AlDente-Charge-Limiter

• Control of the MagSafe LED is software-driven, but routed through

  • The SMC (System Management Controller).

  • Can be manipulated using the SMC API, which documents key

    values for LED control.

• Attackers can:

  • Use software tools or custom scripts (several emerged from

    GitHub issues).

  • Leverage I/O Kit on macOS to interface with the hardware.

Exfiltration Method:

• LED controls can be toggled with precision:

• Requires:

  • Precise control of on/off timing

  • Understanding of data encoding methods

Encoding Challenges:

• Simple binary (e.g., 0000 or 1111) can lead to ambiguity in timing- based detection.

• Manchester Encoding may be needed to avoid repetition ambiguity

  

• Morse code is a viable fallback for slower but clearer data transmission.

  • Don't need rising/falling edge

  • only need steady state

  • New encoding to not be dependent on time

Limitations

• Color masking is not feasible (LED has limited colors).

• Can be detected via High-Security Monitoring (HSM).

• Could be made stealthier by tuning antenna properties of the wire (convert power cable into low-range antenna).

Counter Measures

• Channels require software side component

• Monitor end user devices

• Be aware of such potential attacks

Related Concepts:

• Read Morris Mano - Digital Electronics

• Why Manchester encoding can't work for discrete waves. Digital Electronics & Computer Architecture (background needed)

• macOS IOKit, SMC APIs

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Securing the Mind of Machines

Talk covered the evolving threat landscape around Generative AI.

• The expanding attack surface of GenAI systems and MCP servers

• The MITRE ATLAS threat framework for AI

• OWASP Top 10 for LLMs

Key Points Discussed:

• Prompt Injection

• Data Poisoning & Model Leakage

• Jailbreaking via DAN-style prompts

• RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) manipulation

Defense Techniques:

• Responsible AI and Secure AI frameworks (Google SAIF, NIST RMF)

• Guardrails, Meta Prompts, DSPM

• ISO standards for AI management (42001, 27563)

How red teamers can practice attacks against GenAI systems and what compliance & trust mechanisms are beginning to emerge in the field

This blog discusses the topics covered during the session.